ESSAYS IN SOCIAL THEORY

Jan-Erik **Lane**



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Preface

This Book consists of 6 chapters on Social Theory. It is possible to briefly summarize the content of these chapters.

The mind-body problem receives new attention, partly under the inspiration from the success of quantum mechanics. Here I will discuss reductionism. The mind-body problem remains central to modern philosophy, no doubt stimulated by the progress in brain research. Following Thomas Nagel's article on bats, one may similarly examine one of history's champions. I will also deny reduction or physicalism, though my argument is very much simpler than Chalmers (1996).

One may argue that modern social theory must be relevant for political science. But modern social theory has a strong inclination towards subjectivism: is this relevant for political theory? I do not think so, because subjectivism is in reality a philosophical position, consisting of a theory of epistemology for the social sciences which is not only wrong but borders on nonsense. Modern subjectivism, or as it is somewhat

ludicrously called: `post-modernism', is basically the ambition to crush what is called `objectivism', by launching a special version of 'subjectivism', i.e. a theory regarding what social science knowledge is all about. Thus, subjectivism is an argument for a new epistemology for any kind of social theory, includi4 political science, replacing the major objectivist arguments of the 20th century.

Philosophy of science pays meagre attention to the social sciences and humanities. It deals with basic questions in the natural sciences like Hempel, or general epistemology like e.g. Putnam and Kripke. Popper is the main exception.

In the 21st century there is a new debate about so-called Western values. The beliefs of the occidental countries are attacked, as concealing contempt for other countries, spoken of as orientalist, Muslim or Buddhist. Yet, Western philosophy can only be equivalent to "OCCIDENTALISM" when focused upon truth, truth telling and freedom of choice.

The analytical-synthetic distinction keeps being of great interest. But why? Analytical sentences are camouflaged tautologies. They are not falsifiable, neither in this Kant's world or in any of Leibniz' possible worlds.

The 21st century will most probably be the last one for mankind. First, the threat of nuclear confrontation is imminently present in the Ukraine war, where with escalation, it becomes global. Second, global warming will make life unbearable. There is no strategically viable way out of the heating up of the planet, as every state cheats. Now, we have 425 ppm.

J.E. Lane
Geneva
2024

1 What was it Like to be Caesar Crossing Rubicon 49 B.C.?

Introduction

Otto Neurath spread the theory of the unity of science during the hey days of logical positivism. It entailed a drastic reduction of mental acts to brain or outer behaviour. Philosopher Dennett (1991) ridiculed the "Cartesian theatre", suggesting some like form of reduction. On the other hand, Chalmers devoted much effort to clarifying what reduction of mental states amounts to. He finds that "phenomenological consciousness" can NOT be completely reduced to "psychological consciousness", i.e. the brain. Although his wording is confusing, he definitely rejects Bennett and his biological conclusions.

Yet, Chalmeŕs seems contradictory: on the one hand, he rejects physicalism and materialism in favour of some weak dualism; On the other hand, he finds that any form of experience has consciousness, even a laptop or a simple heater.

This is not the place to debate the research program of finding the brain correlates to consciousness or awareness whether simple or complex. Instead I follow Nagel, but restricting me to humans. For example, in history a key

question is which mindset did CAESAR have, and not the possible reduction of human plans to neurons.

The Rubicon story

What did Julius Caesar think, feel or when crossing this river? We know his outer behaviour from his own writing but how we account for his motives.

In the humanities and social sciences, Caesar during January 49 B.C. would be understood as driven by means and ends. We can only speculate about them, viz suggest which goal function is most probable given what else we know. What matters crucially is his consciousness or intentions. But we can only make hypotheses about his inner behaviour or subjective state.

According to historians Suetonius and Plutarcus, Caesar hesitated and felt anxious when crossing RUBICON around 11 January. Yet he was determined not to give into the Senate demands, thus releasing the civil war—"the dice has been cast". In Caesar's writing, there is nothing that supports this hypothesis.

In his book The Civil War, Caesar speaks about two things:

(1) Discussion with Roman senate and allies in Rome;

(2) Preparations for the coming standoff with Pompejus.

It is rather clear that (1) is only a play of words in a zero sum conflict as well as that (2) is where the real action unfolds. How do we understand or explain the crossing of Rubicon? His inner behaviour or the meaning or intention—Weber (2012) called it "SINN".

Sinn: Mean and ends 49 B.C.

The key to unlocking the RUBICON event lies in Caesar's mind-set that Weber would analyse as means-end intention. Here we follow his idea of IDEAL-TYPES. Caesar is the closest one that can get to the homo politicus modeling of a rationality:

Homo Politicus Model

1. End: power, authority;
2. Means: military, wealth, friends;
3. Correct experience of the situation.

Caesar wanted the dictatorship that Sulla had had. He had an army from the annexation of Gaul, which also provided immense wealth, selling peoples or tribes into slavery. Moreover, he could afford to bribe senators, if needed. He made one mistake, namely trusting his "friends"—"et tu Brutus".

The point here is the reference to Caesar's mind. We are talking about his goals, his experiences, his expectations. Though we may one day have located goals, experiences, and expectations in the brain, it is just not what understanding the RUBICON crossing is about. No need for a Cartesian theatre, no need for reduction of intention to neurons—Chalmers said that it is a question of logical reduction from phenomenal consciousness to brain—never logical. Intention is subjective or personal, impossible to deduce from neurons.

Rational means-end intention

Weber's theory of the subjective side of human conduct implies that intention be analysed as means-end phenomena. As an ideal-type real phenomena are closer or distant from the rational means-end model: clear goals, correct estimation of the probabilities that means further the realization of end.

This model may also be used when human behaviour falls short of rationality, especially mistakes in ends or means. The German catastrophe in the World War II was due to too many goals pursued and insufficient means. Thus, when preparing the invasion of Soviet Union, Hitler allowed Wehrmacht to be drawn into the Balkans and Northern Africa. The mistakes in human action are often due to goals confusion or wrong idea about the conditions for failure or bad outcomes. The means-end framework suits human action well in Parsons' evaluation from 1937. A reduction of Chalmer's type is not relevant even if possible.

Mind-sets are contingent facts

A rational means-end intention is ontologically speaking subjective, but one cannot rely upon "Verstehen" or "einfuelung". Weber emphsized that statements about inner behaviour must be corroborated by evidence from outer behaviour, like letters, sequences of outer behaviour, or own sayings. Statements about inner behaviour are in principle falsifiable, though not always in practice.

The historian or social scientist often has to construct the intention with diverse evidence. He or she must avoid the circle: why cross RUBICON? Because Caesar wanted that. How do you know? He did so.

The rational means-end model captures a mindset that is not culture bound. The stunning three victories of Alexander the Great, like the war behaviour of Churchill or Bismarck's success can be mentioned. When one is confronted by abnormal behaviour, one may refer to mental instability like Stalin and Putin.

One finds countless examples in human history of dismal outcomes being due to an impractical goal or hubris as well as wrong means. Examples: Louis xiv, Charles xii, Napoleon, Mussolini, etc. Ambition and information explain much of behaviour. They are complex functions in the brain, dependent upon neurons but not reducible to them empirically or logically.

Conclusion

The social sciences and history seek an answer to the question "What is it like to be a person" of "What Was it like to be persons". This analysis will not stop at outer behaviour or outcomes, but will include so-called mind phenomena.

Weber emphasized that the social sciences and history focused on the meaning of behaviour, analyzed as means-end reason. It can not be reduced to physical or biological properties. I wish to state the following proposition:

I believe that Caesar in January 49 B.C. was driven by a rational means-end intention.

This proposition is true about my mind even in case of a false belief about Caesar. I was led to it by my brain inter alia. It is subjective but can be verified or made probable.

Plans of means-end type play a major role in human conduct. They are mental constructs, but often comprising mistakes. Even if there is one—to one correspondence between mental act and the brain, it is irrelevant and transaction costs too heavy to enquire.

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2 Ten Subjectivist Dogmas: Or Why Political Science Should not Adopt the Philosophy of Modern Social Theory

Introduction

One may argue that modern social theory must be relevant for political science. But modern social theory has a strong inclination towards subjectivism: is this relevant for political theory? I do not think so, because subjectivism is in reality a philosophical position, consisting of a theory of epistemology for the social sciences which is not only wrong but borders on nonsense. Modern subjectivism, or as it is somewhat ludicrously called: `post-modernism', is basically the ambition to crush what is called `objectivism', by launching a special version of 'subjectivism', i.e. a theory regarding what social science knowledge is all about. Thus, subjectivism is an argument for a new epistemology for any kind of social theory, includi4 political science, replacing the major objectivist arguments of the 2.ot century.

The purpose of this article is to examine the new epistemology of the social sciences, and in doing so, to point out its basic fallacies. I will argue that political science should be based on an objectivist theory of knowledge. There are

actually several schools to choose from: the various so-called positivist schools, the Cambridge School, the Popperian framework, the Weberian philosophy of the social sciences, or why not one of the Scandinavian versions, for instance the Uppsala School or the Oslo School, or, finally, American pragmatism (White, 1956; Wedberg, 1984).

In a recent Ph.D. thesis accepted at Cambridge University, we read the following, which, I believe, is representative of modern social theory:

> The hegemony of positivism and objectivism has been defeated by what Rabinow and Sullivan (1987) aptly term the interpretative turn in the social sciences, that is, the growing influence of subjectivist disciplines such as ethnomethodology, phenomenology and hermeneutics (Mottier, 1998, 26).

One is stunned by such a blunt statement coming out of Cambridge, which early on provided one of the great sources of analytical philosophy in this century. The Cambridge school with its two leading personalities, G.E. Moore, and B. Russell, stated an entire case for objectivism, which had an immense impact on the philosophy of the 20th century. Moore may, of course, have been completely wrong in his strong rejection of subjectivism (Moore, 1959; 1960). However, we would like to find and examine some logical arguments to that effect, before we become 'modern social theorists'.

Now, my intention in this paper is not to criticise V. Mottier, who has no knowledge whatsoever of analytical philosophy, and whose capacity to understand analytical reasoning is nil. My objective is to pin down which positions subjectivism amounts to in modern social theory and to reject them one by one, because there is always the risk that bad theory in the field of sociology could spread to political science.

What, then, are the arguments of these 'subjectivist disciplines' against `objecti vism'?

What Does Subjectivism Claim?

Social theory at the twilight of postmodernist thought focuses upon something called the 'subject'. What is taking place is the deconstruction of subjectivity in the form of a conceptual or philosophical revaluation of subjectivity. To political science this is interesting partly because the discipline belongs to the general class of social theories and partly because it is argued that subjectivity and political agency are interconnected. To what, then, does theorising subjectivity amount? Simply, the key question is: what is 'subjectivity'? Two senses of this magic word can be distinguished.

Primo. In epistemology, one starts from a distinction between the subject, i.e. the person who searches for true knowledge, and the object, i.e. that which is known or true. Thus, the social science researcher is a subject and what he/she researches is an object. Diagram 1 portrays this distinction between the subject and the object in the epistemological sense of a subject reaching out to know the object, at which point the subject may commit two sins, a type I error or a type II error. The relationship between the subject and the object is far from a static one, or involving a process of interaction where the object imprints its shape upon the subject as a Tabula Rasa. Instead, the subject is active in numerous ways in researching the object by the construction of theory, concepts and hypothesis. Accepting false beliefs as well as rejecting true beliefs is a frequent occurrence in the conduct of inquiry, as the interaction between subject and object involves an endless search (Diagram 1).

Diagram 1. *Epistemology: Subject and Object*

SUBJECT	OBJECT
Theories	The external world
Concepts	The Universe
Measurement tools	Social reality

Looking at the history of epistemology, one may claim that there is an emphasis on either the subject or the object in this interaction. Whereas empiricism underlines the object, rationalism places the emphasis upon the subject. Kantian philosophers may be placed somewhere in between these two extremes. Political science studies objects, whether they be identified as micro or macro entities. And the conduct of inquiry in political science is a process through which more becomes know about the object through the activities of the subject. There is no need for political scientists to side with either extreme, denying the subject or the object; instead, they should point to the balance between subject and object.

Secundo. 'Subjectivity' may mean some special attribute of a human being, i.e. the mind and its various states: attitudes, wishes, values etc. The opposition between subject and object is now something entirely different from the epistemological opposition. What is object is something that is not the mind, i.e. materia. Subjectivity is that which involves the mind and objectivity is that which concerns matter. Diagram 2 shows this ontological distinction, which refers to what exists in the universe.

Diagram 2. *Ontology: Mind and Matter*

Consciousness	Matter
Thoughts	Bodies
Emotions	Compactness
Wishes, etc	Energy, etc

Again, in the history of philosophy we find extreme positions denying either the existence of the mind or matter, idealists versus materialists, as it were. Again, political science need not commit itself to any particular position, as it looks at both mind phenomena and matter phenomena. Thus, political science deals with attitudes, values and beliefs but also behaviour. It is impossible to say whether the part of the world that political science examines is generally more consciousness or behaviour.

A subject can, of course, enquire into other people's minds, which then become the object of his enquiry. One must not confuse these two meanings of subject and subjectivity. Finally, there is a third sensible interpretation of subjectivity as meaning that subjects are important, or people matter! Social theory has to struggle with the actor-structure problem, or the distinction between the micro and the macro perspective. Individuals or groups: which are the most important? A classical question in social theory is the problem of holism, or whether a macro unit such as a society is more than simply the aggregation of the micro units, i.e. individual actors. On the one hand, there is methodological individualism, which rejects holism, and on the other hand there is a variety of doctrines which affirms holism, i.e. the belief that the whole determines its parts and not the other way around. Subjectivism may harbour a commitment against holism, insisting upon actors before of society. However, it is an open question whether there is any link between subjectivism and the much more extreme position claiming that only individuals exist, social aggregates being secondary. Political science does best insisting upon a balance between the micro and macro perspectives.

To sum up: if subjectivity is an epistemological theory that underlines the activities of conscious subjects reaching out to understand objects, then all is fine. If subjectivity is an ontological theory which claims that people's attitudes, values and beliefs should be studied, then again all is well. Thus, `subjectivity' as requiring a balance between subject and object in epistemology, as well as insisting upon an ontology which harbours not only phenomena of matter but also of mind, and using both micro and macro approaches to the study of individuals and society, is in my judgement, a sound position to take, at least with regard to the concerns of political science as a social science discipline.

However, subjectivity in social theory harbours much, much more extreme positions. Which, more specifically, are the tenets of subjectivism?

Subjectvisist dogmas

Below I will list some of the major beliefs (B) of modern subjectivism as they are stated in modern social theory. What is at stake here is not the accuracy in rendering a variety of standpoints, but merely focusing upon widely held beliefs, formulated in one version or another. Thus, no attempt will be made here to be absolutely true to each and every statement of these beliefs from various authors. Such an exegesis would require a much longer treatise than what is actually necessary for pinpointing the crucial beliefs.

Thus, what follows below is a critique of a few ideas, stated in an ideal-typical way, and not a descriptively accurate account of the key authors in modern social theory.

(SBJ) Subjectivity has been denied by positivist philosophies

The diamond in the subjectivist social philosophy is something referred to as 'positivism'. All opponents of subjectivism are called 'positivists'. And positivists are said to be the adherents of a set of doctrines in epistemology, ontology and morals. More specifically, positivists are the scholars who adhere to objectivism in epistemology, materialism in ontology and also functionalism, i.e. the doctrine stating that society is determined by needs that go beyond the wishes and preferences of its individuals. They are the villains of the 20 century, the scholars who oppose progress, or who fight radical social thought; who claim that society is more important than individuals, etc.

Yet, in relation to (B 1) one may point out that this set of so-called positivists is empty. There is no philosopher or social scientist who has propagated these three beliefs at the same time. Positivism' has been used as a self-designating term by only two groups, on the one hand the logical positivists of the Vienna school of philosophy during the interwar years, and on the other hand a group of legal scholars insisting upon the study of law as an existing valid order; these were the legal positivists, who wished to separate themselves from natural law scholars. Not much unites these two groups, with the

exception of the common core meaning of 'positivism', i,e. that there exists a reality that is positively given, whatever its nature may be, and which the scholar is actively researching. Some of these people, the legal positivists and the logical positivists, adhered to some of the extreme standpoints referred to above. But others did not, which is the essential point, as these two groups were in no way homogeneous.

It is hardly illuminating to label people as 'positivists' and attribute positions to them as if they all held these views. The group of scholars who did call themselves 'positivists' is very amorphous, but they all insisted upon clear thinking, a respect for the distinction between the subject and the object, as well as a separation between explanations of the world and moral analysis. Positivists have never denied the relevance of subjectivity, not epistemologically, ontologically or from the point of view of holism versus atomism. In modern social theory one reads that positivistic social scientists use the concept of subjectivity pejoratively, unlike objectivity, and believe that it needs to be eliminated from the research process. Not at all. `Subjectivity' may cognitively mean a belief that is arbitrary, ill founded or capricious. Such beliefs have been rejected not only by positivists, but — I trust — by all scholars reflecting upon human beliefs. 'Subjectivity' may also refer to a legal context where there is a lack of rules, or even more seriously, disrespect for the law. Such a form of subjectivity is usually considered to be a threat against the rule of law, or the Rechtsstaat. However, 'subjectivity' meaning 'unwarranted' beliefs or decisions would hardly meet with much approval from anyone, I presume.

Whatever branch of 20th-century analytical philosophy that one consults — positivists or anti-positivists — all start from the subject-object distinction, and they respect that distinction either in the context of discovery or the context of justification. How can one eliminate the subject from the relation of someone knowing something? The subject is active both in the process of discovery of the object and in the process of justifying his/her beliefs. Human knowledge is a distinctly human enterprise, but in so far as it is true

knowledge it is knowledge about an object outside of the subject — 'true' meaning corresponding to the world.

The talk about 'positivism' in modern social science is more confusion than illumination: what is it? There are so many different schools that are ridiculed as being 'positivist' that the word has no distinct meaning. (SB1) is nonsense.

(SB2) Social reality is basically a subjective world

According to modern social theory, objectivism considers social practices to be objects that are exterior to the observer, similarly to the phenomena that are studied by the natural sciences. However, a fundamental tenet of modern social theory is that the social sciences are radically different from the natural sciences, because they examine subjective phenomena. What can be meant by 'subjective' phenomena here? We must ask this question first, before we move on to the conclusion drawn in modern social theory: that since the object is subjective, then the object vanishes.

Now we encounter something entirely different from (SB 1), because (SB2) concerns only the social sciences. The question is now: what is the nature of social reality, i.e. social life resulting from human interaction? (SB2) is not the same as the general epistemological problem of how a subject knows an object, which is also a problem in physics and the other natural sciences. (SB2) is not a question of epistemology (how can a subject know an object) but raises a question of ontology (what is reality).

For modern social theory, when approaching social reality, the main focus of study is the purposeful, reasoning human agent. Action, in this context, is seen as the outcome of individual intentionality. This is an often used definition of the concept of action as involving two separate elements, behaviour or movements in space and time, on the one hand, and intention or motivation, conceived of as a mind phenomena or as the 'meaning' of the behaviour, on the other hand. In the philosophy of the social sciences this distinction between mere behaviour, or outer movements, and action as involving an inner aspect, has been the focus of much prolonged methodological disagreements. The core

disagreement has been between two approaches that centre on two extremes: (1) behaviourism, or the denial of the existence of intention or motivation; and (2) subjectivism, or the position that the essential aspects of action consist of its meaning or the motivational side.

Political science should reject both of these absurd positions. It can very well say that social reality is 'subjectively lived' but that it also consists of phenomena that are not 'subjectively lived'. If action is behaviour that is orientated in its course, then social reality would by definition comprise both behaviour and intention, both physical movements and mind phenomena. Much of social science is analyses of mind phenomena, but it is not exclusively that. In micro analysis, it is true that one attempts to look at behaviour as the maximisation of interests, given existing knowledge and preferences, i.e. mind phenomena, but in macro analysis there is no hindrance to focusing upon unintended or unrecognised states.

One must distinguish between the perspective of the actor and that of the researcher. If one fails to distinguish between the two, then as in modern social theory, (SBI) will be mixed up with SB2 all the time. Let us use a simple table (Table 1).

Table 1. *Epistemology versus ontology*

		Ontology	
		Behaviour	Intention
Epistemology	Subject	I	II
	Object	III	IV

From the perspective of the researcher, both behaviour (Ill) and intention (IV) are objects of study. That the intention of an actor is 'subjectively lived' by the actor does not preclude it being an object of study for a researcher at the same time. Epistemologically speaking, a subject may face different methodological problems when attempting to find knowledge about behaviour (I) and intention (Il), because they are different kinds of entities, but one cannot draw the conclusion that because a researcher wants to know something about an intention, the researcher cannot be

objective. Equally erroneous is the claim of modern social theory that the social world is not an external world.

(SB3) There is no external world

Social life stems from the interaction of human beings, ego and alter in the most simple form of interaction. Ego's behaviour is orientated versus alter's behaviour, which entails that there is both behaviour and intention on the part of both. Surely, this is all part of an external world to the researcher in the same sense as objects are epistemologically external to the subject, whatever the objects are made of. But modern social theory states that there is no external world. How come?

Subjectivism, like all so-called interpretative approaches, does not define social reality as an exterior object, we are told. Social reality is seen as a subjectively lived construct, from which it follows, modern social theory claims, that the study of social reality as an 'external object' is in fact a methodological impossibility. Here, we have not only the confusion of the two senses of 'subjectivity' established above. This is even worse, as it entails that other people's minds — 'subjectively lived' phenomena — is not the analysis of an external object. Surely, other people's minds are outside the mind of the researcher and do exist as an 'external object'. For example, when one does attitudinal research about Swiss people — their behaviour as well as their attitudes — then surely these phenomena are outside of the researcher's mind and do exist in the external world.

Table 2. *External and Internal Worlds — Ego and Alter*

	Internal World	External World
Ego	A	B
Alter	C	D

Does 'external' mean outside of the researcher? Or does it mean nonintentional objects? Take the case of the most elementary type of social interaction: ego versus alter. What is now internal and what is external? The question is

meaningless, as one must specify: what is internal to whom and what is external to whom. Look at Table 2.

Clearly, both ego and alter have perceptions about each other as well as intentions when they interact. These phenomena constitute internal worlds to ego (A) and alter (C) in the sense that the ideas and wishes of ego and alter remain purely private or secret if they are not disclosed. However, ego's behaviour (B) as well as alter's behaviour (D) make up an external world that is not private or secret. Even the most elementary form of social reality does not consist of merely internal worlds. (SB3) is fundamentally ambiguous, but in whatever manner it is interpreted it cannot carry the argument that there is no external world. External to whom?

(SB4) Human existence is an internal world

If subjectivism is a theory that emphasises the importance of 'subjectively lived' phenomena for social life, then there is little cause for objection. Ideas, preferences, images, ideologies, religions, etc. are of fundamental importance in society. Such entities are examined in political science as well as in economics. I do not know of any objectivists in the 20th century who have denied the existence of such phenomena or shown an awareness of the methodological problems involved in studying them. However, subjectivism asserts much more extreme positions, claiming that such mind phenomena constitute a world of its own, a world that is not an object world or an external world, and that it cannot be analysed by the ordinary canons of scientific analysis. Is (SB4) true? Is social reality only a set of mind phenomena?

How ideas, preferences and other mind phenomena are to be analysed ontologically is one of the classical topics of philosophy (Putnam, 1979); it is the ghost in the machine question. Is mind radically different from matter? If so, in what sense of radically different? Political science needs to get involved in the dispute between idealists and materialists, as it were. Political science can accept a position which states that behaviour is different from intention and that intentions constitute an internal world whereas behaviour is part of an external world. However, internal worlds do exist and can be

the object of social science research just as external worlds. One can argue, as G. Ryle and W.V.O. Quine did, that thoughts, preferences and the like can be explained without assuming the existence of a separate ontological entity like awareness (Hookway, 1988). Or one can claim that the concept of the mind is not reducible to behaviour or language, as Adolf Phalèn did (Marc-Wogau, 1968). What is ontologically speaking the difference between voting in an election and the intention to vote in an election? Can one have knowledge about the intention of an actor without knowing the behaviour of the actor?

For social science purposes these are interesting and profound but not quite relevant philosophical questions about what exists in the most fundamental sense of 'existence'. Similarly, one may ask: what is human existence? Modern social theory claims that human existence is 'subjectively lived'. By whom, we may ask? The actor him/herself? Or the researcher? Let us quote a typical statement of modern social theory:

> …interpretative approaches do not define social reality as an exterior object. Social reality is seen instead as a subjectively lived construct. In the Heideggerian formulation of this position, the fundamental structure of human existence (Dasein), is being-in-the world (In-der-Welt- sein) (see Boutot 1991; Steiner 1978). It follows that the study of social reality as an 'external object' is in fact a methodological impossibility (Mottier, 1998, 20).

If one accepts the Heideggerian interpretation of human existence as being in the world in the ordinary language sense of these words, then one fails to understand why social reality could not be an external object for the researcher. Even if one equates human existence with subjectively lived phenomena such as thoughts, interests and images, the conclusion does not follow, since other people's minds can be researched as exterior objects. Yet, human existence involves not only subjectively lived phenomena but also entities that are not

mind phenomena: behaviour, predicaments, situations, outcomes, etc., which define human existence.

One may argue that certain social phenomena, like culture or religion, carry a heavy meaning component, and thus, such phenomena are subjectively lived ones. How can one understand the ethics of Calvinism without an interpretative approach focusing upon how human behaviour was experienced and valued by the main authors in this tradition? Whether God is part of an external world or not need not bother the researcher, as his interest lies in how various writers looked at the relation between what is believed to be God and Man/Woman. But other social phenomena, such as the extermination of millions of Jews during the Nazi period, are not a subjectively lived construct. Auschwitz, Dachau, and Treblinka are exterior objects just as the behaviour that the Nazis demonstrated in those and other places.

Human existence is not only a subjectively lived world. And when it is such a subjectively lived world, then it remains an exterior object to the researcher. I can read and interpret Calvin in order to describe and analyse his religious thoughts (epistemological object). And when religious thoughts become pervasively accepted by many followers, then they certainly form exterior objects with large consequences for social life (alter's thoughts being exterior to ego). In a sense, all mind entities are interior ones, because they exist in somebody's consciousness. Take away the consciousness of a person, and the thoughts, wishes, interests, emotions, etc. of that very same person disappear. However, this interior nature of mind phenomena does not entail epistemological subjectivism in the sense that these objects cannot be studied. Nor does it entail that they are not exterior to other actors who definitely have to take into account the existence of other people's minds.

If one takes the (absurd) position that 'the fundamental structure of human existence' is not an exterior object, then how is social science possible? What is the rationale of testing hypotheses? What does falsification amount to? 'Subjectivism' may mean a very extreme epistemological position according to which one can only know one's own mind. That is an

epistemology which is impossible to accommodate within political science.

To see that one can be an epistemological subjectivist, emphasising the role of the subject in relation to the object, and reject all forms of exterior worlds whether natural or social, one could examine the writings of Leibniz and his monadologie. Thus, one can be a subjectivist also in relation to the universe, or the world of the natural sciences. Of course, the extreme position of Leibniz has had very few followers.

(SB5) The methodology of the social sciences is radically differentfrom that of the natural sciences

Subjectivism is not only an epistemological theory or an ontological position. In addition, it harbours a special methodology, which — it argues — follows from the ontological standpoint. Thus, we read from a typical modern social theory interpretation:

> The crucial issues of the conflict of methods remain firmly placed at the centre of later methodological debates within the social sciences. At the origin of the conflict was the question of whether the emerging social sciences should become autonomous from the natural sciences from a methodological point of view. The stakes of the debate are high, as the answer to that question depends on the way in which the subject matter of the social sciences is defined (Mottier, 1998: 17).

Does the subjectivist ontological position entail that the social sciences must adopt a methodology that is different from the natural sciences? Suppose it is true that the social world consists only of mind phenomena, are we then to conclude that this mind world can only be researched with methods that are entirely different from the methods employed to enquire into the material world? Before we can evaluate this radical claim, we must arrive at an understanding of what is meant by the methodological

autonomy of the social sciences. What methods are, then, appropriate for the enquiry into mind phenomena?

It should be pointed out that we are not looking for just another version of the subjectivist epistemological position, which claims that it is irrelevant to adopt a perspective suggesting a neutral and objective study of social reality. We know already that subjectivism rejects such a perspective. What we wish to know is why the social sciences cannot or should not use methods that are similar to the ones employed in the natural sciences, or — as it is also expressed — are merely 'imported from the natural sciences'. What can be meant by this radical statement (SB5)? Let us use another quote from a standard exposition of modern social theory:

> The links between causes and reasons have been the object of profound disagreements within the philosophy of action. The conceptual connections between action, meaning, and subjectivity are similarly at the centre of historical controversies within the social sciences. Social theory has in this respect traditionally been divided between objectivism, and subjectivism. Objectivism sees society as having priority over the individual agent, and social institutions as the prime centre of social analysis. Action is treated as the outcome of causal structures (Mottier, 1998: 17).

In this quotation, we find not one position but several standpoints superimposed upon each other, which are not logically connected at all. They are not even of the same dimension, so to speak, as one of the arguments, namely that concerning society versus the individual, is strictly normative or moral. We must discuss them one by one.

(SB6) Social reality can never be explained through generalisations

Subjectivism favours an ideographic methodology while accusing objectivism of being nomothetic. Mind phenomena lie outside the scope of generalisations, because they lack causes. One should distinguish between these two grounds

for rejecting a nomothetical approach, one denying causality in social reality and the other stating the general irrelevance of any kind of generalisation. One may debate whether the notion of causality entails the idea of a generalisation or law-like statement, and vice versa. Yet, it is enough here to discuss whether probabilistic generalisations are relevant for the social sciences in general and political science in particular.

If (SB6) is correct, then subjectivism may move one step further, denying causality in the social reality. However, such an additional claim would have to be based upon a Humean interpretation of causality as constant conjunction. If the social sciences cannot even use probabilistic generalisations at all, then how can it ever dream of arriving at invariant, universal generalisations lacking all time and space parameters?

Yet, it seems absurd to deny the legitimate use of statistical generalisations within the social sciences. Such propositions are employed all the time in economic and political science in order to move from a particular case to a statistical generalisation covering a large set of cases. It is generally agreed that statistical tests allow for more certain conclusions that the findings in a case study. As long as no one can suggest an a priori argument against the use of statistical generalisations within the social sciences, then one would be foolish not to use them. It could well be the case that some of these statistical generalisations constitute errors resulting from spurious correlations or simply wrong measurements. However, why should one use statistical generalisations in order to describe and explain social reality?

Subjectivism, when confronted with this reasonable objection, does not give an answer on the methodological arena but goes back to its ontological position, claiming that social reality, being made up of only mind phenomena, never recurs but only constitutes a unique flow of events. Suppose that one accepts the ontological position of subjectivism, i.e. suppose that one starts from the assumption that social reality is made up of mind phenomena. Then, why would one not engage in statistical research uncovering attitudes, beliefs, values, norms, etc.? It seems simply arbitrary to argue that

mind phenomena could not possibly display regularities. As a matter of fact, research into religious beliefs as well as non-religious values has resulted in a lot of knowledge about mind phenomena, which takes the form of probability statements.

One does not need to decide whether probabilistic generalisations could constitute causal laws in order to argue that the social sciences may use statistical regularities to their benefit. It is an open question whether the universe has a deterministic structure or a probabilistic one. What is true of the social sciences, however, is that all the empirical research has only been able to corroborate statistical regularities. Thus, one need not commit oneself to the position that social reality is subjected to universal laws in order to accept the relevance of statistical regularities. Whether these regularities contain some critical temporal or spatial parameter limiting their validity to some time period or some set of countries may be relevant to the question whether they constitute law-like generalisations or merely temporal and spatial aggregations of averages. Yet, even such statistical generalisations that summarise averages are extremely helpful in social science research. Thus, (SB6) is untenable. We need to go to a stronger version of (SB5).

(SB7) Intentions can never be the cause of human behaviour

The rejection of generalisation only makes sense if (SB6) is combined with (SB7). In a Humean interpretation of causality, saying that A is the cause of B entails a probabilistic generalisation, at least, or a law-like statement at most. Thus, if the principle of causality does not reign in social reality, then there would be no need for generalisation. And, inversely, if generalisations hold in the social reality, then they could ground causal attributions, for instance a counterfactual statement to the effect that if not A, then B, even though A. Above, we have rejected this close association between probabilistic generalisations and the concept of causality, as one may wish to use the information contained in a probabilistic generalisation containing a time and space

parameter without making any claim about causality. Be that as it may, we must discuss (SB7) independently of (SB6).

In any action there is behaviour and intention. The subjectivists argue that only the intention is part of the social reality. This is wrong. Also behaviour enters the social reality. Admitting this, can we conclude that an intention can be the cause of a behaviour? Or, if one claims that intentions are mind phenomena and all mind phenomena are radically different from behaviour, one may pose the question in the following manner: can a mind phenomenon be the cause of a behaviour? Here we face two major questions in philosophy, with many different answers but as of now no agreement:

(QI) What is the nature of an intention or a motive or a reason?
(Q2) Can an intention or a reason be a Humean cause of a behaviour?

These two questions are no doubt extremely tricky, as the work of D. Davidson shows (Evnine, 1991). I do not see the social sciences as dependent upon whether one answers YES or NO to one or both questions. The social sciences utilise statistical generalisations all the time in order to master their mass of knowledge. These generalisations take different forms, but they carry no implications for the resolution of the major problems in philosophy.

Statistical generalisations are employed at various levels of knowledge. And they cover both intentions and behaviour. Sometimes, it is a question of merely aggregating empirical findings. Sometimes, it is a question about testing hypotheses on the relationships between factors. Rarely, one encounters a universal generalisation. However, statistical generalisations are extremely valuable in organising social science knowledge. They structure not only behavioural phenomena but also mind phenomena. And they formulate hypotheses on connections between mind phenomena, such as religious beliefs, and behaviour, such as economic outcomes.

Thus, (SB7) does not entail that generalisations cannot play a role in the conduct of social research, whatever the

cognitive status of (SB7) in itself may be. Probability statements perform a useful function not only in macro research which is only indirectly related to intentions, but also in micro research about attitudes as well as behaviour. Whether my intention to vote is a Humean cause of my actual voting is an interesting philosophical problem, but the resolution of this question, one way or the other, has limited implications for the use of probability generalisations in political science research. A subjectivist dogma that is close to (SB7) takes an even stronger stance about social causality, completely denying its existence.

(SB8) Social causality does not exist

(SB7) may entail (SB8) only if one argues that intentions are the basic or important entities in social reality. However, one may arrive at (SB8) without (SB7). Suppose that one argues that social reality is basically randomness, then one could accept probability and deny causality as determination. One does not need a theory of intentions in order to deny causality in the social reality. If one starts from intentions, then one does not need to arrive at (SB8) in any case, since one may embrace a theory of intentions that allow them to be so-called Humean causes. However, if one denies that intentions can be Humean causes, then one could still argue that social reality includes causality, because intentions are not the only elements of social reality, which also comprises behaviour.

The argument about determination is thus different from (SB7), as one could arrive at the thesis of indetermination without employing a theory of intentions. Taking a stochastic approach to causality, i.e. equating causes with probabilities, allows for a medium position in between strict determination and strict indetermination. It seems highly capricious and extremely extravagant to deny the legitimate and frequent use of probabilistic associations in social sciences research. A question which is always interesting to raise concerns whether a probabilistic association could be interpreted as indicating a stable causal structure underneath the structure of

appearance, or whether it is a matter of an association that is time and space bound.

One may conduct a long philosophical discussion about whether the world behind the appearances is truly probabilistic in nature or whether probability is a measure of the lack of complete knowledge. In any case, probabilities derived from the analysis of data offer the materials for causal induction, resulting in theories about causal connections, with or without stochastic elements.

(SB9) Objectivism implies the argument that society is more important than individuals.

Now, when claiming (SB9), subjectivism enters an entirely different terrain, namely ethics and normative discourse. The target of criticism is the socalled functionalist framework within the social sciences, or structuralfunctionalism. Here, one must separate two things. It is one thing whether the functionalist framework contains an explicit or implicit commitment towards a holistic ethics, giving priority to the needs of society before the interests of single individuals. But it is another matter whether functionalism, whatever it may say about society and the individual, is a doctrine that is logically connected with objectivism. If one refutes the main bulk of the subjectivist dogmas, (SB must one adhere to functionalism?

This is not the place to embark upon a lengthy discussion of functionalism in one version or another. It is perfectly enough to say that structural-functionalism has been extensively discussed, and it is perhaps not entirely wrong to assert that its appeal has diminished rather drastically, mainly due to a criticism of its basic beliefs launched by scholars adhering to some kind of objectivism (Black, 1961). A so-called functionalist explanation raises difficult questions about teleology which make a passage from biology to the social sciences problematic. There is a large literature on the structure of a functionalist explanation, whether or not it is scientific, but there is no decisive result as of yet.

If it is true that functionalism entails an ethical reasoning - we underline 'IF', and if it is also true that functionalism,

containing a moral argument, implies that social needs are more important than individual interests, then functionalism is outside of the domain of objectivism. Not only is the distinction between the IS and the OUGHT firmly entrenched within almost all major forms of objectivism, but even when objectivist scholars do engage in moral reasoning there is tendency to uniformly favour one set of values ahead of another, except for a rejection of totalitarian philosophies. (SB9) is empirically false, as the major objectivist scholars of this century have opposed collectivism. And it is not likely that they are fooling themselves, meaning that they would adhere to a philosophy that implies positions they would hate to endorse. I fail to see that objectivism along the lines suggested by scholars such as Moore, Hägerström, Popper, Hayek or the leading Americans (Goodman 1972; Putnam 1972) would entail functionalism, or any commitment to the societal oppression of individuals.

(SBIO) By insisting upon the distinction between IS and OUGHT, objectivism requires the impossible

In all forms of subjectivism, there is a strong tendency to argue that social theory is entirely different from natural social theory. We have encountered one such line of argument above, focusing upon the so-called subjective nature of social reality, here meaning that social reality basically consists of something that is not matter: consciousness or mind. However, (SB 10) adds another kind of dimension to 'subjectivism', as 'subjectivity' now is not ontological but pertains to the distinction between neutrality and partiality. Now it is not a matter of the values of actors, but of the values of the scholar.

Actually, we here enter into another great debate in philosophy about the relations between values and knowledge; how values enter the conduct of scientific enquiry — value premises — and condition the end results of such research — value-loaded research or biased research. In order to discuss (SB 10), one must make a sharp distinction between the values of the observer and the values of the actor observed. 'Subjective' may mean that the actors of the social

reality hold preferences and express values in their behaviour. Thus, how can social theory be value free, if values play an important part in shaping behaviour and values enter the mind world? 'Subjective' may mean something entirely different, namely that a scholar cannot describe, explain or analyse the world without evaluating it in terms of his own values. Value-free research would be research that is neutral in relation to what it investigates or in relation to what it states as true about the world.

Take the case of a norm that is institutionalised in a society. One needs to separate between the norm and the analysis of that norm. Just as one can establish whether a norm is applied or not, one can also distinguish between a positive and a negative evaluation of the norm. Actually, all four possibilities are not only logical but occur frequently. To state that a norm exists or does not exist is independent of whether one claims that the norm is desirable or not desirable. Thus, the IS and the OUGHT can be separated. Thus, there is no logical connection between the following three sentences:

(i) Julius Caesar acted against the Roman Constitution when he crossed the Rubicon River,

(ii) Julius Caesar was a detestable tyrant, (iii) Julius Caesar was a noble man.

It is not only logically possible but also in reality quite feasible to distinguish between the values of the actors and the values of the analyst. Thus, sentences (i) - (iii) above are not entailed in the following sentence:

(iv) Brutus and Cassius detested Caesar because he broke the Roman Constitution.

Refusing to distinguish between the values that one describes and one's own values is often the basis of a justifiable accusation of wrong-doing, as being 'subjective' meaning partial or biased. Impartiality may be difficult to achieve, but it is neither a muddled conception nor an impossible strategy. Social science need not be value loaded.

(SB 10) is a fallacy. Understanding people's values does not entail that one must share these values oneself. One can describe and analyse norms in a neutral manner. 'Normative

analysis' stand for two different things, the analysis of norms that exist and the recommendation of norms that one may wish existed.

Modernity and objectivity

We are witnessing the emergence of a general social science theory subjectivism, which harbours a totality of views concerning the nature of knowledge about society (epistemology), the nature of social reality (ontology), the nature of social explanation (methodology) as well as the nature of social morality (ethics). It is true that the three sisters of ethnomethodology, phenomenology and hermeneutics have existed for some time as a kind of alternative to the main philosophies which have developed from the Enlightenment, such as Marxism. They seek their sources among philosophers who reject the basic distinctions at which Hume arrived: between is and ought, between existence and possibility, between the particular and the general, between law-likeness and obligation, between reason and emotion, between deduction and induction. Among the subjectivists one usually encounters deep admiration for philosophers who rejected either Occidental civilisation (Nietsche) or who suggested entirely different meanings for basic philosophical terms (Heidegger). Today, there is a reunion of the messages of the three sisters of subjectivism, meaning that its Weltanchauung stands strong within social theory, or what I assume to be roughly equivalent — within sociology.

Subjectivism should not be adopted within political science, because its basic tenets, (SBI) - (SB8), constitute one fallacy after the other. A textbook on modern social theory presents the goals of 'speculative social science' in the following manner:

> Put rather abstractly, the idea of a speculative social science is informed by four basic principles: that Hegel's notion of 'spirit' is the recognition of the truth /finitude of its temporal forms; (2) that social science explanations recognize and abstract

> particular (and essential) forms from the totality of ethical life; (3) that this abstraction is acknowledged as the condition of social critique; and (4) that 'sociality' (ethical life) is recognized as formed through the differentiation (of the concept), not as the suppression of difference (Abbinnett 1988, 37).

Actually, in this programme declaration we can retrieve all the subjectivist dogmas criticised above. Drawing upon the major achievements within 20th-century analytical philosophy, I would argue that all of Abbinnett's four standpoints are wrong. First, social reality involves more than spirit and spirit is not the same as true knowledge; second, the social sciences cannot relinquish its generalising methodology, not even when it tries to explain spirit or morals; third, the social sciences carry no logical commitment to social critique beyond what is entailed in the concept of truth; fourth, the social sciences must model themselves on not only altruism but also egoism if truth is to be approached.

I do not posit analytical philosophy as a compact framework where political science may find its proper epistemology, ontology and methodology. Although there has been a tendency towards reunion in analytical philosophy, the predicament today remains one of fierce competition between alternative schools in the philosophy of pure reason (Couvalis, 1997). Yet, the requirement of objectivity and what it entails for the conduct of enquiry stands as strong now as it did during the Enlightenment.

The late Aaron Wildavsky raised a highly relevant question in relation to the so-called subjectivist disciplines: 'Has modernity killed objectivity?' Critical theory and its various offspring, as well as post-modernist philosophy, harbour a basic tenet which involves a most drastic deviation from the conception of science, inherited from the Enlightenment, namely the distinction between belief and the world.

Beliefs are either true or false, whereas the world is or is not. Science is the search for true knowledge, i.e. beliefs which correspond to the world. A belief about the world as being so and so is true only if the world is such. From this

irreducible relationship between a knowing subject and the known object follows a number of ethical rules guiding the conduct of enquiry: objectivity, neutrality and inter-subjectivity (Scheffler, 1982). Modern social theory suggests that these rules are not longer relevant, that somehow the social sciences can do without them. Although Wildavsky was preoccupied with cultural theory at the time of his death, i.e. with the phenomena of the mind world, such as values, attitudes and beliefs, he could not relax the norms that regulate the conduct of enquiry (Thompson, Ellis & Wildavsky, 1990).

Conclusion

In subjectivist texts like the above-mentioned Ph.D. thesis by Mottier, one finds an unbelievable philosophical amateurism. Simply stunning sentences are piled upon one another. Had the thesis been offered at a philosophical department in Cambridge, I cannot believe that the heirs of Moore and Russell would say 'accepted'. Yet, why this strong emergence of a subjectivist methodology in sociology at this moment? As philosophy has become dominated by the achievements in logical analysis, it has also left the field open for a new amateurism, searching answers to valid questions that logical analysis may not be able to solve or advance. This is sad, as it is as difficult to steer between Scylla and Charybdis as it is to have to choose between social theory and formal logic. One thing is certain: If political science adopts the epistemology of social theory, then it will be going downhill rapidly.

Let me end by quoting yet another example from Mottier's thesis at Cambridge. She writes about the set of subjectivists that they include the following major philosophers of the 20th century:

> In addition to the interpretive critique of positivist and objectivist perspectives, other attacks have come from authors such as Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyerabend, Hesse and Bashar on the other hand (Mottier, 1998, 26).

How is it possible to put together Popper and Feyerabend as both being critics of objectivism? Writing such passages on the modern philosophy of science is simply just producing rubbish, as everyone knows that Popper was a great objectivist and Feyerabend was an anarchist.

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3 Fundamental issues in social science

Introduction

C.P. Snow (2013) introduced us to the divide between 2 sets of cultures in academia. His message from 1959 has increased relevance today. The natural sciences have newly invented strange concepts like inflation, anti-matter and selfish genes, whereas the social sciences and the humanities stay with humans and their sense data concepts, although sadly the new discipline of philosophy of science offers little insight into the special problematics of the KULTURWISS-ENSCHFTEN, as philosopher Rickert (1920) called one of Snow's cultures around 1900. One may point out that already Bolzmann's concept of entropy sits uncomfortably with cultural sciences and economic development or growth. One is stunned by physics debating whether time is illusion. However, Popper was not only a heavyweight in philosophy, but also knowable in social science.

I will here attempt to point out some of the main philosophical problems of Richert's cultural sciences, i.e. social science.

A few chief issues

I emphasize the following problems in a philosophy of culture sciences. First we have:

Ontology

The social sciences and the humanities inquire into humans and their cultures in a wide sense. Speaking generally, it is matter of understanding inner and outer behaviour. What matter is to the natural sciences, the event is to the culture sciences. The event in time and space could be physical behaviour or movement. Or it could also be mind events. Or both, as in intentional behaviour.

The distinction between inner and outer behaviour is very relevant to the hu- manities. One finds here that concepts like end, means, ambition and plan are employed to create consistency among outer behaviours. One may refer to goals as a type of mind phenomena to separate zeal from actual behaviour and out- come.

Example 1: after the capture of Western Europe, Hitler wanted peace with England and planned the attack on Soviet Union. Rejected, his goal was to force England. This could only bring capitalism together with communism—two fronts war.

Moreover, Hitler dragged Germany into two hopeless Mussolini wars, binding armies in the South. The outcome was that Germany was not ready for a Blitzkrieg against Soviet. Hitler never grasped the strategy of Blitzkrieg, favouring gattrition war in the East. Given these inconsistency in behaviour, jumping the gun whe- rever and whenever, one must enquire into his psyche. Remember that Hitler came out of the Vienna gutter, being educated on very low quality stuff.

Example 2: the outer behaviour of king Gustavus Adolphus entering the 30 years war is well-known, but the driving goal? Protestantism? Economic incen- tives? Big power gaming? Territorial gains? Military dexterity and prowess?

In economics, revealed preferences are underlined, some regarding outer be- haviour as merely manifestations of inner incentives. Sociology and political science deal with

intentional behaviour—action, but what is an intention? In any case, intention seems fundamental in mind—how to study it is the topic of philoso- phy of mind like mental accounting.

Interestingly, Clausewitz' definition of "war" stressed the clash of wills with violent means. And Talcott Parsons emphasized the actors' orientations in his general sociology.

John Searle's Insight

No philosopher of mind or language has paralleled Searle in understanding the role of the mind in human civilisations. His book The Construction of Social Reality (Searle, 1997) argues convincingly that mind phenomena—beliefs and incentives—make up society together with outer behaviour. In collective beha- viour, the mental components may be very complex, as above in the year long planning of Barbarossa-Sinnzusammenhang (Weber). Motive or reason is inner behaviour and it has been debated whether a reason could be a cause of outer behaviour (Davidson, 2001). In any case, means and ends are mental concepts to be distinguished from cause and effect or outcomes.

Epistemology

The ontology of inner quter behaviour has implications for knowledge, where inner behaviour is often mentioned "subjectivity" and outer behaviour "objec- tivity". This is rather confusing, as other minds are also subjects besides display- ing outer behaviour.

Within the culture sciences, the knowledge search has a Popperian flavour. This means an emphasis on falsifiability and confirmation.

In the classic scheme one separates between logic and mathematics on the one hand, as well as synthetic science; and moreover in addition, the a-priori on the one hand and a-posteriori on the other hand. In social science and the humani- ties the analytic proposition—synthetic a-priori in Kantian verbiage—plays a neg- ative role. In philosophy, one finds a huge debate on the combinations: synthetic a-priori or analytical proposition and necessary truths a-posteriori.

The culture sciences emphasize synthetic a-posteriori sentences, because they satisfy Popper's (1934) falsifiability.

In fact, the culture sciences place a great emphasis upon evidence. This applies to causal analysis, using much statistics to model relationships among variables.

At the same time, behaviourism in various versions is rejected, because the study of inner behaviour matters. It has even been argued that economics is a "subjective" discipline dealing with wants and needs as well as value and expectations.

Value

As Gunnar Myrdal (1958, 1970) emphasized in his methodology for inquiry into political economy, key words in social theory are many times loaded with value. Take for instance "economic efficiency" or "democracy" and "justice". By defin- ing value loaded terms by means of a set of properties, one transfers the value to these properties.

Myrdal went so far as to state that value threatened objectivity in social en- quiry.

Analyticity 1

The most cited article in philosophy today is Quine's (1953) analysis of the sen- tence:

(S) All bachelors are unmarried men.

Using the correspondence notion of truth, a social scientist would hardly look for empirical evidence for (S). Instead one could claim that (S) is true analytical- ly through:

1) Definition
2) Meaning
3) Set theory
4) Predicate logic

Quine (1953) denied that (S) was analytically true by rejecting all four inter- pretations. We will concentrate upon a), or i.e. that (S) is true by definition.

Language comprises definitions of terms, but there is hardly a one to one rela- tion between word and meaning. If a dictionary D states that two expressions—"bachelor" and

"unmarried man" are synonyms, can one then make the substi- tution:

(S1) All unmarried men are unmarried?
(S1) is a tautology, but is (S) then analytically true?

Dictionaries report facts about language usage, which is often ambiguous and changing.

Quinè's questioning of analytic sentences led to a wide debate about key con- cepts such as synonymy and meaning.

Necessity

Analytical sentences like "ice is frozen water" should be separated from sen- tences like "tigers are animals", which is not a-priori, yet true in every possible world. This has no counterpart in the culture sciences. This is possible world semantics. Could it be applied to history: Hitler won the Second World War? No one has yet developed it.

The cultural sciences underline contingency in all the events. Consider for a moment the basic law of Darwinian biology: "All species survive due to their of capacity for adaptation in the struggle for life". Is it synthetic a priori or analytic aposteriori? Does it matter?

Definitions of Words

The epistemological situation in the social sciences is different, as one relies of- ten upon stipulative definition. Since the culture theories come in ordinary vo- cabulary—ambiguity and opaqueness, key terms need to be given an unambi- guous meaning. Hence the use of stipulative definitions is important, but it also raises the problem of analyticity. Actually, analytic sentences take an important place in the social sciences.

Analyticity 2

The relevance of inquiries into the misuse of analytical sentences in the social sciences is clear, when focusing upon e.g. "democracy" and "polyarchy".

Philosopher A. Naess (1956) together with Stein Rokkan inquired into the many uses of "democracy" in a famous study from 1956. They found many meanings, often contrary ones. What to do to reduce ambiguity and semantic confusion? The standard approach is to rely upon stipulation and then proceed with empirical enquiries. But it generates analytic propositions. Often theories in the social sciences have stipulations about key terms with following "analytical" propositions from stipulation, explicit or implicit. Revealing analytical sentences helps one determine the scope of a theory

Given the much use of stipulations in the social sciences, one must handle the value loaded words with care. Some terms like "democracy" is positively valued; and the positive value is transferred and results in a tautology.

Real Definition

"Polyarchy" as concept is found already with the Ancients. But R. Dahl (1971) made it famous in his book from 1971. So what is a polyarchy today? "Polyarchy" means to R. Dahl a political regime where we have:

1) Political accountability
2) Legislation by representative bodies
3) Free and fair elections
4) Bill of rights
5) Freedom of association
6) Freedom of the press

These institutions as conditions are necessary and sufficient for polyarchy, but not for democracy, states Dahl. Here, do we have a real definition or a theory capturing the essence of polyarchy? Or is it just another meaning of "democracy"?

Ideal Definition

To be more specific, Dahl stressed the positive value of the term "democracy", which could be transferred to a democratic country. However, Dahl adhered to the view that democracy does not really exist anywhere.

Instead of pointing at a few democracies, Dahl looked upon democracy as an ideal nowhere realised. He thought

about a definition like: Democracy = political equality, a regime "completely responsible to all its citizens".

This is not merely ideal, but more seriously impractical. No system of institu- tions could deliver this, simply due to the zero sum nature of conflicts in politics. Dahl argues that polyarchy as above is the closest one can get to the ideal of democracy. Thus, his main thesis that polyarchy is "democracy in development" is an analytical statement.

If the denotation of "democracy" targets the West European political systems, then the key connotation would compromise competition among party elites, participation of citizens and the rule of law.

Objectivity

Few scholars question the objective nature of the natural sciences. But what does this mean? The opposite is subjectivity, and it is often argued that the culture sciences are basically subjective.

The notion of subjectivity here is not ontological meaning inner behaviour. Nor is it a term for value loadedness, i.e. the often use of value loaded words.

Instead, the idea is that the knowing subject—the researcher—cannot fully account for his/her object. Thus subjectivity implies failing objectivity. Somehow the subject leaves his/her unmistakable mark on the object of study. Among his- torians it is often said that each generation looks upon events with different eyes. Social scientists underline the role of the different models when handling data.

One encounters this subjective theory of knowledge with Leibniz (2022) and Mannheim for instance besides of. "Situationsgebundenheit" was Mannheim's term for subjectivism. Weber (1922) acknowledged that the researching subject was active in relation to the object, but he still uphold objectivity as Popper's (2002) falsifiability.

Micro and Macro

The cultural sciences face a micro-macro problematic. The macro analysis tar- gets a country or society as a whole. The

social sciences employ statistics to un- cover cross-sectional macro relationships. The humanities are much longitudinally focussed. What about the micro perspective?

Von Wright (1973), well-known professor of philosophy, analyses two ba- sic modes of explanation: nomothetic and teleological. The former employs Hempel's well-known law-like generalizing, while the latter points at motive and intention or rationality. This distinction between a Galilean model and Aristote- lian model is developed by means of von Wright's insights into deontic logic—the logic of norms or what one OUGHT to do.

Von Wright rejects the Hempel (1965) explanation model for. This amounts to a very strange claim about human actions.

Consider the following syllogism:

1) X intends to bring about P

2) X considers that he cannot bring about P unless he does A

3) Therefore X sets himself to do A.

This typical Wright explanation model is incorrect, as it does not explain the action A but the intention of P. The relationship between the intention to do A (inner behaviour) and actually doing A (outer behaviour) is probabilist ic in Hempel's framework (inductive-probabilistic model).

Rationality and Morality

If a person P is in a situation S, is the reply to "what thing to do" unique? Von Wright must say Yes, but theories of decision making simply entail No. Game Theory may look for Nash equilibria, but complexity or ignorance soon set in. Mistakes abound. Probability may be hard to calculate. Strategy may call for less than rationality.

The culture sciences have to confront the problems of rationality or reason for acting.

Parfit (2022) inquires into "the thing to do" with reason as morality. The ex- pression "thing to do" is both empirical (Wright) and normative (Toulmin, 1950; Barry, 1995).

Reasons and Persons offers a deep analysis, sometimes longish, of the moral aspects of rationality. Parfit (2022) aims

to show that the simple version of ra- tionality as enlightened egoism typical of economic man (woman) is wrong or misguided. He relies upon the standard 2 sided PD game, arguing that the Pare- to inferior outcome violates rationality as avoiding self-defeating.

So be it! Like Hume and, Weber, I doubt that REASON is capable of delivery of morals by itself. Anyhow, Parfit adds a new solution concept besides individual rationality on the one hand and collective rationality on the other hand. This changes the entire game or interaction. The self-defeating strategy is cooperation actually.

Parfit argues that the PD game will have other solution than the self-defeating one. This requires rationality to comprise morality. Of course, this constitutes a key problem in politics, economics and ethics. Thus, for instance Barry 1995 defines the concept of justice as the thing that no one could reasonable reject/rationality as reasonably acceptable—circular definition? "Justice as impartiality" would be re- jected by libertarians Hayek (1978) and Nozick (1974)—reasonably?

Conclusion

We find a few basic research issues in KULTURWISSENSCHAFTEN, i.e. the humanities and social science. These problems are not much discussed in the philosophy of science. They include inner and outer behaviour, rationality and value. However they were penetrated by great Germans: Windelband (1894), Rickert and especially Weber around 1900. In philosophy of science the parallel between Wissenschaftslehre and Logik der Forschung has never been discussed.

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4 Occidentalism Questioned

Introduction

The Western world is criticized for hypocrisy about climate change, capitalist exploitation and orientalist attitudes towards the other civilizations. I wish here to argue that only the first criticism is valid. Actually, all governments renege on environmental policy.

The global debate on science and technology, economics and development as well as global warming is dominated by the West: EU and USA, UK and Canada as well as Oceania and Japan. The BRIC is hardly a counterweight as it has too little coherence. The Russian attack on the Ukraine has pitted the West against the East. The following critiques are launched against the Western democracies.

Orientalism

The theme of orientalism maintains that westerners look down upon other civilizations or cultures. This orientalist discourse was clearly formulated in literature by Said (1973), but it has a background in history and cultural studies with an

implicit idea about Muslim beliefs and values. The orientalist themes resonate well with universities in Arab countries and India where Said often became honorary doctor. The themes of orientalism include: (i) Tradition, (ii) Gender inequality and (iii) Religious fervor.

Yet, in serious history enquiry into the three monotheistic religions, there is no room for bias. One has to employ the well-known methods of evidence also when taking on the big questions like:

(a) Were the alleged founder of regions beliefs historical persons: Moses, Jesus and Muhammed?

(b) When were the key religious texts composed and by whom?

(c) Are the proportions different between types of believers: fanatics or zealots, lukewarm, and hypocrites?

In orientalism, Islam is either accused of fundamentalism (jihad) or hypocrisy (just observing the tradition of FIVEDUTIES).

Capitalist exploitation

The West is much richer than the East, when it comes to GDP per capita. The total GDP of China (18 trillion USD 2022) and of India (4 trillion USD 2022) is not far from that of US (25 trillion USD 2022). The average living standard is however much higher in Western states with the exception of the Gulf monarchies and Singapore.

The economic advantages of the West are looked upon by the others mainly as the outcome of colonialism. The narrative is that the gap can be narrowed by states like China, India and the Gulf, if the rules of the global market game would be fair. The Asian and African countries complain with support often from Latin America that the global market institutions favor the West.

The response to Western economic dominance has been to either turn to another institution or mechanism than the Western market economic system, or to adopt it whole heartedly.

The planned economy was a major attempt to create an alternative to the capitalist economy. Tried in several countries, it failed in the 1980ies in Soviet Union and its satellites. Another development model was import substitution, employed in Asia and Latin America. It was abandoned in the 1990ies.

On the other hand, the economies like China and India that emulated decentralized capitalism performed much better.

Thus, we are now left with one global economy with a regime for creating a level playing field –the WTO institutions. Communism and socialism belong to the 20th century. Today the economy is either pure capitalism or the welfare state. In the latter, citizens have access to free or subsided public services. The oil monarchies also provide free public services.

Environmental gap

The suspicion of Occidentalism recurs in global environmental policy coordination. West is not only accused of having caused global warming through their oil thirst, but they are also told to take a much greater share of the necessary cuts in CO_2 emissions. It is true that western countries started industrial revolution much earlier including the CO_2 emissions. However, as Table 1 indicates, a few of the largest emitters are non-Western.

Table 1. *Top seven emitters total CO_2 2022*

Country	% of world emissions
China	29
USA	11
India	7.3
Russia	4.8
Brazil	2.4
Indonesia	2.3
Japan	2.2

Yet, the non-western countries argue at the COP meetings that Table 2 is more relevant.

Table 2. *CO2 emissions per capita of the top emitters*

Country	GDP per capita (tonnes)
China	11.0
USA	17.9
India	2.8
Russia	18.0
Brazil	6.0
Indonesia	4.5
Japan	9.4

The drive for cuts in emission of greenhouse gases should be based on Table 2 and not Table 1, according to the non-western counties.

Eastern polities

The ongoing wars in the world today have rejuvenated the theme of clash between civilisations, as suggested by Huntington (1996).

Orientalism used to be a big theme in the occidental view of Arabia, Islam and Turkey. A key person in the development of the Orientalist theme was Montesquieu. He characterized the Oriental society in Persian Letters (1730) as male chauvinist (harem) as well as fundamentally hierarchical. Moreover, he also coined the expreśśion "Oriental Despotism" when analyzing the first typical polity. Thus, orientalism entailed gender inequality and personal and intellectual unfreedom. It was in his major work The Spirit of the Laws (1748) that Montesquieu characterized Eastern civilisations as despotic.

However, Wittfogel offered an alternative perspective on despotism. Instead of viewing it as a flawed institution, he linked it up with social efficiency. Fo̍llowȉng Max Weber, Wittfogel (1957) focused the access to clean water in “hydraulic societies”, which required centralised government

for drinking water and irrigation. A few majestic rivers or lakes called for large scale water management.

Herodotes

The orientalist perspective may be traced to Greek historian Herodot's story of the Persian wars, where the barbarians were defeated – a theme given philosophical connotations by Hegel. In his recent book Llewellyn-Jones (2022) argues that the regime of the Alchaemids has been interpreted in this light, and unjustly so. I remain unconvinced though due to the presentation of ruling families in this book.

West and East

There is no fixated demarcation line between Western and Eastern countries. Today we have the OECD versus Asia with a few exceptions like Japan and South Korea. More precisely, the US and the EU confronts Russia, China and central Asia. With the invasion of the Ukraine, Russia appears no longer European. The so-called Shanghai Group of nations stands against the West in addition to the BRIC nations.

The sedation between West and Shanghai + BRÌC used to be affluene, but no longer so. The Molem world enters also the East with th 59 countries in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation OIC although Turkey is in the Nato.

Especially for the Arab league and Iran, the state of Israel is viewed as originating inorientalism. It is not only a matter of the territory of old Palestine but also the occidental meeting with Islam. There is no Eastern one religion like Christianity in the West.

Around 1900, the Koran was seen as a copy of the Bible. Weber devoted books to Calvinism and the various religions of India and China. He wrote a couple of pages on Islam, "a religion of warriors" (Weber, 1978).

This is surprising, given his interest in religion and politics. Thus, Weber bypassed the idea of Islamic fundamentalism with ibn Taymiyya and the rise of Salafism. In the 20th century his ideas were reinvented in a violent rejection of

occidental hegemony. As a matter of fact, Islam is rich on different interpretations of Islam of various groups with political consequences, in e.g. New York and Gaza.

Occidentalism today

Occidentalism used to entail capitalism and environmental exploitation. Yet, the Western countries have something inherently positive, namely the firm institutionalization of the search for truth and individual freedom. This should now be seen as the core of occidentalism.

The West may have acted wrongly in the Ukraine, as J. Sachs argues on YouTube. It may also have supported Israel naively and in a partial manner, as N. Chomsky has argued on YouTube. However, neither Chomsky nor Sachs would be allowed or tolerated in the East. People in Ukraine or in Israel cherish individual freedom and the pursuit of truth. A majority of people in the East would like to live under the institutions of property, life and liberty, as Locke expressed it.

Conclusion

The West is no longer the land of the „white man". Western nations comprise sizeable minorities from other civilizations. And the pressure on immigration is immense.

Why? Poverty – of course, but not only. Rule of law and liberty is valued also by immigrants from the East.

To claim that the Ukraine is basically Russian or that the Jews should live according to the One Stare Solution is to miss the point.

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5 The Analytic-Synthetic Distinction and the Social Sciences

Introduction

Max Analytical proposition, I argue, is a tool for scientific critique. Thus, its value is negative, namely revealing that sentences may just be true by definition lacking any correspondence to reality. In the social sciences analyticity offers a powerful tool to separate out definitions from truth. There is only implication and factual statements. Analytical statements are not falsifiable (Popper, 2002).

In philosophy today we notice a widespread scepticism about analytical propositions or sentences. There is a strong echo of Quines rejection of analytical relations debated much in the philosophy of science. However, in the philosophy of the social sciences the distinction between the analytical and the synthetic is useful for criticism.

In relation to a major social science theory, one needs to look more closely at the key propositions in order to test for falsifiability and empirical confirmation. Before one would test a theory by measurements and indicators, we ask which

propositions are analytic and which are synthetic. This amounts to sound methodology as one does not want to test propositions that are analytic. Yet, several philosophers of science deny analytical propositions or sentences, arguing that truth by virtue of meaning is impossible.

Denying analyticity

Already Hume spoke of the analytic-synthetic distinction, but it was Kant who developed it into a complex classification of propositions: logical, analytical, a posteriori, a priori, etc. The epistemological idea can be expressed in various ways. The most cited is Quinè's analysis (1953) of the sentence:

(S) All bachelors are unmarried men.

Using the correspondence notion of truth, one would not look for empirical evidence for (S). Instead one could claim that (S) is true analytically through:

a) Definition
b) Meaning
c) Set theory
d) Predicate logic.

Quine (1953) denied that (S) was analytically true or a Kant's transcendent truth by rejecting all four interpretations. We will concentrate upon a) or i.e. that (S) is true by definition.

Language comprises definitions of words but there is hardly a one—one relation between words and meanings. If a dictionary D states that two expressions—"bachelor" and "unmarried man" are synonymous, one can then make the substitution:

(S1) All unmarried men are unmarried?
(S1) is a tautology, but is (S) then a transcendental truth?

Dictionaries report facts about language usage which is often ambiguous and changing.

Quinè's questioning of analytical sentences led to a wide debate about key concepts such as synonymity and meaning

(Putnam 1975). It was continued in modal logic where analytic truth was equated with necessary truth—see Kripke.

Analytical Sentences in the Social Sciences

The epistemological situation in the social sciences is different as one relies much upon stipulative definitions. Since the theories are formulated in ordinary vocabulary—ambiguity and opaqueness—key terms need to be given an unambiguous meaning. Hence the use of stipulative definitions is important, but it also raises the problem of analyticity. Actually, analytic sentences take an important place in the social sciences. And with the multitude of definitions, analytical propositions, and especially stipulation seem non-appropriate.

We will argue for the relevance of inquiries into analytical sentences in the social sciences by focusing upon "democracy" and "polyarchy".

Democracy: Many meanings

Philosopher A. Naess together with Stein Rokkan inquired into the many uses of "democracy" in a famous study from 1956. They found several meanings, often contrary ones. What should be done to reduce ambiguity and semantic confusion? The standard approach is to rely upon stipulation and then proceed with empirical enquiries. But it generates lots of analytical propositions. Let us exemplify:

(D1) democracy = participation
(D2) democracy = rule of law
(D3) democracy = socialism

Given these stipulations one arrives at propositions such as:

(P1) The more of referenda the more democratic;
(P2) The more of countervailing powers the more democratic;
(P3) The less of capitalism the more of democracy.

By pairing stipulations with propositions—D1 to P1 etc.—we arrive at truths by definitions. But are they not factually false?

These propositions together with its stipulation are empty, as assertions saying nothing about the world. One may say that they are true by definition, although they have no factual content but just reformulate the corresponding definitions: P1-D1, etc.

Often theories in the social sciences have these stipulations about key terms with the following "analytical" propositions from stipulation, explicit or implicit. Revealing analytical sentences helps one determine the scope of a theory.

Given the much use of stipulations in the social sciences, one must handle the value loaded words with care. Some terms like "democracy" are positively valued and when defined as above D1-D3 the positive value is transferred and results in a tautology:

(T1) Swiss cantons are highly democratic;
(T2) USA is the democracy par excellence;
(T3) Soviet democracy was real democracy.

These statements correspond to the different definitions D1-D3 and are non-falsifiable.

Polyarchy

The link between stipulations and analytical sentences in the social sciences appears in the discussion about R. Dahl's concept of polyarchy. This concept is found already with the Ancients. But Dahl (1970) made it famous in his book. So what is a polyarchy today?

"Polyarchy" means to Dahl a political regime where we have:

1. Constitutionalism
2. Legislation by representative bodies
3. Free and fair elections
4. Bill of rights
5. Freedom of association

6. Freedom of the press

These conditions are necessary and sufficient for polyarchy but not for democracy, states Dahl.

First, polyarchy is not the same as democracy according to D1, D2, and D3. Second, Dahl claims that "democracy" refers to an ideal where the state is ruled by everyone equally. Thus, polyarchy is just democracy in development—Dahl's key thesis.

Here we have a conclusion that is an analytical statement summary of a few definitions or stipulations. In reality, the Dahl thesis is empty since democracy as real political equality can never be realised.

Real definition of democracy

Dahl invented the term "polyarchy" because the word "democracy" was too value loaded. Schumpeter had no reservations about listing the necessary and sufficient properties of existing democratic regimes. We quote from Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942):

"Democracy is a political method, Thatcher is to say, a certain type of instutional arrangemang for arriving at political legislative and administrative decision and henne incapable of being an end in itself."

This does not amount to a stipulative definition but is a characterization of living democracies when Schumpeter was around. Such an approach is sometimes said to aim at a real definition. And it does not result in any analyticity. "Democracy as the competition among political elites" is just the famous Schumpeter conclusion.

Conclusion

Analytical propositions are said to be true by definition or meaning. Endorsing the correspondence concept of truth, analytical sentences are merely camouflaged tautology.

True by meaning is typical of analytical propositions. Yet, meaning is always subjective—see Weber's analysis of "Sinn" in Wissenschaftslehre. There is no objective meaning like

Plato's concepts. In the social sciences, terms mean how they are defined by dictionaries or individual scholars.

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6 A Philosophy of Pessimism

Introduction

In the standard historical narrative of philosophy, the philosopher of pessimism is A. Schopenhauer. Let us consult his The World as Will and Representation from 1858.

As a matter of fact, this book is not very pessimistic, as typically claimed. By the German “Wille” Schopenhauer means volition in general or will to survival in particular. His book has been misunderstood, because it is not about pessimism in general, but contains Kantian type epistemology and an anticipation of elements of Darwinism. Schopenhauer constructed a most complex metaphysical system. He had much positive to say about art, architecture and poetry.

It is true that Schopenhauer is again read with great interest, as “Wille” is interpreted as energy. But his basic subjectivist standpoint is difficult to accept. Not only are time, space and causation merely faculties of the mind, but behind all the Kantian phenomena there is just one thing in itself—namely “Wille" or energy.

Yet, there are other and more relevant sources of pessimism than Schopenhauer's thesis that will restrain intellect.

Pessimism 1

In the commentaries to the Ukrainian war, the possibility of nuclear warfare is discussed.

Nuclear warfare has again become a topic of urgent debate (Kaplan, 2022). The interest in nuclear warfare concerns both strategic and tactical issues. Strategic use of nukes lies behind the present realignment of powers and coalitions like the expansion of the NATO. What, moreover, is tactical nuclear warfare?

Putin and Russia

President Putin is waging an invasion war against the Ukraine. In reality he is putting his power at issue and perhaps the future survival of Russia, if not mankind.

The sudden invasion has turned into an attrition war, hugely costly for the two countries. Putin maintains before his Kremlin entourage that Russia will prevail. This is improbable, given the support by Western countries to Ukraine. But can Putin take a defeat? Or will he use the huge arsenal of nuclear weapons somehow? It is difficult to see Putin stepping down orderly.

The official argument for the annexation of Crimea and the attack on Ukraine is that West threatened Russian existence. The events in Kiev 2014 would constitute causa belli.

Putin is often said to aiming at some enlargement of Russia, like under the Soviet period. This is simply impossible, as the former Soviet republics guard their newly won independence. What Putin wants is to deal with like-minded in the countries bordering Russia.

What has replaced the Soviet republics is dictatorships with exception for the Baltic. Government is in the hands of a "click" of people, who enrich themselves and their cronies. There is only one threat, namely democracy. If democracy survives in Ukraine, it would seriously affect the stability of

not only Belarus and Kazakhstan but also Russia itself. Hitherto, Putin has clambered down on all opposition by increasingly drastic measures. The Ukrainian war is as much about territory as about regime.

One may add that the ambition of Ukraine to become member of the EU and the NATO is a consequence of the Russian will to control. Can Russia come to accept a democratic Ukraine?

Nuclear warfare

Is a turn to nuclear weapons possible from Putin's Russia? One often encounters the idea of tactical nuclear warfare, but it is not clear what this amounts to.

Thinking about nuclear warfare in the Ukraine forces one to consider the distinction between strategic and tactical nuclear war. In one version tactical nukes could be handled by individual soldiers attacking a small target. The strategic employment of nukes now includes many hydrogen bombs and a set of carriers and rockets. Putin himself has on various occasion hinted at the possible use of nukes, if Russia's territory is invaded including the land areas occupied in eastern Ukraine.

Logic of nuclear warfare

In his general theory of war (1832), Clausewitz argued that war is the fight with violence between the wills—the will of the attacker to have his/her will obeyed. The violent confrontation between two or more parties or armies has been theorized, based on huge date information. Thus, we know much about strategy and tactics with, e.g., Alexander, Caesar, and Napoleon. More important, we know the real outcomes. Not so with regard to nuclear warfare.

Now, which principles could one deduce about nuclear war on the basis of two real events and some experiments? By following the American debate, one arrives at:

1. First strike capability: No one has this.

2. Second strike capability: USA, Russia, and China have this. North Korea has neither against USA.

3. Escalation instantaneously: Inexorably expanding of nuclear warfare: Only by striking out the centre of every nuclear site can a state prevail.

Russia will not likely take a defeat in the Ukraine. Putin is probably going to play his last and most powerful card releasing perhaps a global catastrophe.

Zaporizhzhia

The Russian performance in the Ukraine war may release a nuclear disaster at the largest atomic power plant. It would kill and harm a large number of people through radioactive contamination. The damage could not be compared with the catastrophe of nuclear warfare in one form or another. But it would hurt the Ukraine badly.

A nuclear disaster at the largest plant in Ukraine would not only cut electricity to Kiev but also carry contamination risks for both parties. Hitherto the Russian army has erased lots of infrastructure, but the four reactors at Zaporizhzhia still operates. Perhaps the Russians hope to capture it for own use.

Pessimism 2

The distinction between verbiage and practical action is telling when it comes to the second globally looming catastrophe. There is no new equilibrium in sight, as global warming does not release any counter forces. We can only wait for the tipping points to set in. Global warming is a cumulative process where all consequences have one direction. Figure 1 shows developments since 1990.



Figure 1. *CO2 emissions and global temp.*

Although the phenomena of climate change had been known for 200 years, the key text was published in 1989: S. Schneider's Global Warming: Are We Heating up the Planet? Yes, our constantly increasing need for energy leads to higher CO_2 levels.

The link between global warming and energy makes it very difficult to combat climate change. Every state seeks to avoid energy shortage. If necessary, coal or natural gas will be used. In several countries wood is burnt. All advanced countries cheat in their own way.

In the developing countries the forests are cut down for a variety of selfish purposes: agriculture, charcoal, house building, and decorative goals. Poor and landless people figure prominently when the rainforest is invaded.

The energy shortages are augmented by the premature shutdown of nuclear stations. Nuclear power is a source of energy that is both valued and frightening.

Source of pessimism: State egoism

States guard their sovereignty jealously. States are prepared to act when vital interests are at stake, including opportunism, cheating, and violence. Energy is high on the list of state priorities.

State egoism does not exclude intergovernmental cooperation and states' coordination. But when vital interests are concerned, states will renege. They may sign international treaties but refrain from implementing.

Hobbes following the Epicurean tradition predicted the war of all against all as well as total chaos in Parliament from his egoism axiom. He therefore preferred kingship—one will. But surely kings or autocrats can be incredibly selfish! It seems that Putin has managed to lay his private hands on some of the assets of Yukos and Gazprom. Embezzlement and autocracy hit Russia with a vengeance.

State egoism is of another order. When energy is lacking, even red-green governments look for fossils. The CO_2s will continue rising.

The present rules over the future

When states act, their decision making is characterized by: Myopia, Opportunism, Status quo, Reneging.

If there is an energy crisis, states go back to fossils. If some states offer much green policy-making, then others may offer little when states coordinate. If there is a threat to state existence or longevity, the money goes to weapon procurement. If states promise too much, they can always repent. As the greatest ever political philosopher expressed it (Leviathan): covenants without the sword are but words.

Conclusion

The 21st century looks gloomy. The optimism that Elinor Ostrom (1990) expounded about voluntary cooperation in relation to commons appears undone by state egoism and opportunism.

Most states are much too much arming, although climate change will be lethal.

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